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ABSTRACT
All models of legal governance and most regulatory options have to do with
‘top-down’ solutions as an essential ingredient of the approach. Such models
may include ‘bottom-up’ forms of self-regulation, such as in forms of ex post
regulation, or unenforced self-regulation. This paper focuses on what lies in
between such top-down and bottom-up approaches, namely, the middle-out
interface of the analysis. Within the EU legal framework, this middle-out layer
is mainly associated with forms of co-regulation, as deﬁned by Recital 44 of
the 2010 AVMS Directive and Article 5(2) of the GDPR. However, there are also
additional models on how we should grasp the middle-out layer of legal
regulation, as shown by the debates on the governance of AI and the Web of
Data. For example, the debates on issues such as monitored self-regulation,
coordination mechanisms for good AI governance, and ‘wind-rose’ models for
the Web of Data make it clear that co-regulation is not the only alternative to
both bottom-up and top-down approaches. From a methodological
viewpoint, the middle-out approach sheds light on three diﬀerent kinds of
issues that regard (i) how to strike a balance between multiple regulatory
systems; (ii) how to align primary and secondary rules of the law; and (iii) how
to properly coordinate bottom-up and top-down policy choices. The
increasing complexity of technological regulation recommends new models of
governance that revolve around this middle-out analytical ground.
KEYWORDS Artiﬁcial intelligence; data protection; GDPR; governance; legal design; level of abstraction;
middle-out approach; regulatory system; techno-regulation; Web of Data
1. Introduction
Legal regulation plays a crucial role in the toolkit of global governance and, in
particular, of ‘good enough governance,’ as Koﬁ Annan put it in his
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inauguration speech as UN Secretary-General in July 1997. Merilee Grindle
has analysed and distinguished eight diﬀerent meanings of the notion ‘govern-
ance’ that have emerged in this context. Most meanings and deﬁnitions
include legal regulation as a key component of the model: for example, in
the words of the World Bank, governance refers to ‘the process and insti-
tutions through which decisions are made and authority in a country is exer-
cised.’1 Others deﬁne governance as ‘the formation and stewardship of the
formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which
state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions.’2
Yet legal regulation is a complex notion of its own. It includes not only
rules, but also values, principles, standards, protocols and guidelines. A tra-
ditional distinction refers to the tripartition of legal regulation, co-regulation,
and self-regulation:
(a) Legal regulation can be understood as a form of legal information for
reality, namely, a set of rules or instructions for the determination of
every legal subject of the system. Examples are the rules of legislators
that aim to directly govern social and individual behaviour. Such rules
mostly hinge on a normative stance or the threat of physical sanctions,
in accordance with Hermann Cohen’s and Hans Kelsen’s consequential-
ist formula ‘if A, then B ought to follow’3;
(b) Co-regulation refers to how legal regulation, that is, public hetero-regu-
lation and private self-regulation interact. According to Recital 44 of
the 2010 Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive, namely, D-
2010/13/EU, co-regulation provides in its minimal form ‘a legal link
between self-regulation and the national legislator… In co-regulation,
the regulatory role is shared between stakeholders and the government
or the national regulatory authorities or bodies’;
(c) Self-regulation regards any kind of bottom-up approach. The AVMS
directive presents the notion as ‘a type of voluntary initiative which
enables economic operators, social partners, non-governmental organis-
ations and associations to adopt common guidelines amongst themselves
and for themselves.’
In between legal regulation and self-regulation, scholars have provided
diﬀerent kinds of scales and taxonomies in order to understand how top-
down forms of legal regulation and bottom-up solutions can be mixed. For
example, in Marsden’s ‘Beaufort scale’ of self- and co-regulation, 11
diﬀerent scales are singled out, from ‘pure’ unenforced self-regulation, such
1See M Grindle, ‘Good Enough Governance Revisited’ (2007) 25(5) Development Policy Review 533–74.
2ibid. See also U Pagallo, ‘Good Onlife Governance: On Law, Spontaneous Orders, and Design’ in L Floridi
(ed), The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era (Springer 2015) 161–77.
3The formula in H Kelsen, General Theory of the Law and the State (Harvard University Press 1949).
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as in Second Life (scale 0), to an independent body with stakeholder forum, in
which top-down regulations of the government are imposed and co-regulated
through taxation and/or compulsory levy.4 These multiple models of regu-
lation overlap with diﬀerent governance options on how to tackle the inter-
action between (i) law and ethics; (ii) general vs. sector-speciﬁc regulation;
(iii) diﬀerent needs that may be regulated; (iv) diﬀerent levels of regulation
(e.g. global, international, national, or regional); and (v) diﬀerent ways in
which we can modernise the legal framework.5 These views and models on
technological governance and regulation concern design-based or behavioural
options, premarket approval systems, RegTech and SuperTech solutions,
experimental policy-making and command and control options, much as
monitoring and oversight mechanisms (e.g. regulatory bodies), ex post regu-
lation and co-regulative mechanisms, down to such accompanying measures
as regulatory agencies, ethical review boards, and so on.
This toolkit of legal governance brings us back to the tripartition of legal
regulation introduced above. In the case of governance, the attention of
lawyers and policy makers is drawn to the interplay between the regulatory
aims of the law and those of further regulatory systems, such as the forces
of the market, or of social norms. Legal regulation is a way, although impor-
tant, in which such a balance between regulatory systems may actually be
struck. A model of the EU institutions on co-regulation helps us in setting
our own level of abstraction on regulation, co-regulation, and self-regulation.
The AVMS deﬁnition of co-regulation can indeed be grasped as a layer in
between the extremes of a spectrum, with the regulatory powers of the law,
especially the ‘top down’ rules of legislation found on one end, and forms
of pure self-regulation on the other. The EU deﬁnition of co-regulation
thus deﬁnes a middle path between the traditional top-down approaches
and bottom-up solutions of legal regulation. One of the main assumptions
of this paper is that the model of co-regulation is not actually good enough
to grasp the complexity of the problems we are dealing with, such as the
current initiatives on AI governance and its legal regulation. The aim of
this paper is to address and formalise the complexity of today’s technological
regulation and models of governance, by dwelling on this middle layer of the
analysis. Figure 1 illustrates setting the level of abstraction we are referring to:
Following a well-established tradition in computer science, that which lies
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches represents the middle-out
layer of the model. We borrow this terminology here, because both computer
science and practical sciences such as law and economics should address the
constraints that arise during the design process when upgrading existing
4See Ch Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation and Constitutionalism: Towards a More Nuanced View (29 August
2011) <https://ssrn.com/ abstract=1973328>.
5See M Ebers, ‘Regulating AI and Robotics: Ethical and Legal Challenges’ in M Ebers and S Navas Navarro
(eds), Algorithms and Law (Cambridge University Press 2019 forthcoming).
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systems. From a legal viewpoint, the aim is to ﬂesh out the set of observables
and variables of the analysis, the result of which represents a model for the
ﬁeld.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the middle-out
approach, which deﬁnes the level of abstraction of the paper. The intent is
to formalise the set of rules and procedures that may lie in between the
diﬀerent forms of top-down legislation and unenforced self-regulation.
Section 3 presents the law as a regulatory system with its policy options. As
regards the middle-out layer of the analysis, such policy options concern
the balance between multiple regulatory systems and the mix between
primary and secondary rules of the law. The EU model of co-regulation in
the ﬁeld of data protection, i.e. the General Data Protection Regulation, or
GDPR, shows how this model works. In particular, Section 4 focuses on the
principle of accountability with its technicalities, such as in Article 5(2) of
the GDPR. The latter properly reﬂects the middle-out interface of both top-
down and bottom-up mechanisms that lay the groundwork for the co-regu-
latory model of the EU legislator. Section 5 shows that the GDPR’s model
of co-regulation, however, oﬀers no magic bullet for today’s governance of
AI and the Web of Data. We are called on to devise new middle-out
approaches, such as forms of ‘monitored self-regulation,’ or coordinative
mechanisms for ‘adaptive regulators.’ Leaving aside the merit of these
Figure 1. Setting the level of abstraction.
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proposals, the intent is to show how today’s initiatives and debates on the gov-
ernance of AI and the Web of Data demonstrate that co-regulation is not the
only alternative to the bottom-up and top-down approaches. The complexity
of today’s legal issues on regulation recommend additional forms of law
making that revolve around the middle-out interface of the analysis. The
aim should be to identify a good mix between the bottom-up and top-
down solutions, and to make this mix our model of good enough governance.
2. Levels of abstraction
From a methodological viewpoint, a ‘level of abstraction’ oﬀers us the means
with which to set the proper level of analysis. The level of abstraction can be
considered as a sort of interface, whose function is to deﬁne the features repre-
senting the observables and variables of the research, thereby providing a
model for the area of concern.6 This methodological approach can be illus-
trated with the three main components of (i) the interface of the model; (ii)
its observables; and (iii) variables.
As to the interface, consider the regulatory aims of the law and in particu-
lar, the sets of legal regulation, of co-regulation, and of self-regulation men-
tioned above in the introduction. We noted that both the top-down and
the bottom-up approaches were among the observables of the analysis. As
to the top-down approaches, i.e. rules that aim to govern individual behaviour
and social interaction, the variables of the analysis may concern diﬀerent
needs or interests that should be regulated, as well as diﬀerent levels of regu-
lation, such as in international, national, or regional legislation. In the ﬁeld of
technological innovation, more speciﬁcally, the hard tools of the law comprise
several diﬀerent techniques. The aim can be to attain (i) particular eﬀects; (ii)
functional equivalence between online and oﬄine activities; (iii) non-dis-
crimination between technologies with equivalent eﬀects; and (iv) future-
prooﬁng of the law that should neither hinder the advance of technology,
nor require over-frequent revision to deal with such progress.7
As to the bottom-up approaches, the variables of the analysis can be illustrated
with the eight forms of self-regulation inMarsden’s ‘Beaufort scale’, or with Frie-
drich Hayek’s work on self-regulation and the emergence of unintentional
orders, i.e. that which he also dubbed as spontaneous orders, or the kosmos
side of the law.8 Among the main advocates of self-regulation we ﬁnd, of
6See L Floridi, ‘The Method of Levels of Abstraction’ (2007) 18(3) Minds and Machines 303–29; and U
Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts (Springer 2013).
7See BJ Koops, ‘Should ICT Regulation be Technology-neutral?’ in BJ Koops et al (eds), Starting Points for ICT
Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-liners (TMC Asser 2006) 77–108; Ch Reed, Making Laws
for Cyberspace (Oxford University Press 2012); and U Pagallo, ‘The Realignment of the Sources of the Law
and their Meaning in an Information Society’ (2015) 28(1) Philosophy & Technology 57–73.
8The reference text is FA von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Vol. 1: Rules and Order University of
Chicago Press 1982).
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course, corporations and, more generally speaking, the forces of the market.
Still, social self-regulation was one of the most popular models of internet gov-
ernance in the early 2000s.9 A vibrant debate on how online communities have,
or rapidly develop, their social norms,10 revolved around some of the ways in
which the digital revolution has progressively put social self-regulation in the
spotlight. By taking into account the normative challenges brought about by
technological innovation, such asAI, this bottom-up approach can be strength-
ened through participatory mechanisms that aim to ensure alignment with
societal values and understanding of public opinion through an ongoing dialo-
gue between all stakeholders.11 Further mechanisms regard the idea of ‘inclus-
ive innovation’ and smooth transition to new kinds of jobs via rewarding
human-machine collaboration, multi-stakeholder upstream collaboration for
risk mitigation, and systems for user-driven benchmarking of all oﬀerings in,
e.g. the AI market.
Together with the top-down and bottom-up approaches, e.g. Hayek’s taxis
and kosmos sides of the law, we should also explore that which lies in between.
This is the problem illustrated in Figure 1 in the introduction. Two magni-
tudes of complexity are under scrutiny. As regards the vertical dimension
of the ﬁgure, i.e. the top-down and bottom-up, the intricacy of regulation
concerns the interaction between multiple regulatory systems, such as the
law, the forces of the market, and of social norms. As to the horizontal dimen-
sion of the ﬁgure, diﬀerent sets of legal rules can appear. That which we dub
as the middle-out layer of the analysis, following a well-established tradition
in computer science, has thus to cast light on how this mix of rules and bal-
ances between regulatory systems may address the constraints that arise
during the design process. This was, after all, what the EU institutions
hoped to achieve when replacing the 1995 directive on data protection
with the new set of rules in the 2016 GDPR. These provisions, correspond-
ingly, aim to:
(i) strike a balance between multiple regulatory systems;
(ii) align diﬀerent kinds of legal rules; and
(iii) propose a governance model on this basis, to help clarify what is at stake
in other domains of the legal ﬁeld, such as in current discussions on the
governance of AI and the Web of Data.
9See LB Solum, ‘Models of Internet Governance’ in LA Bygrave and J Bing (eds), Internet Governance: Infra-
structure and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2009) 48–91.
10See, among others, AD Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Routle-
dge-Cavendish 2007); Th Schultz, ‘Private Legal Systems: What Cyberspace Might Teach Legal Theorists’
(2007) 10 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 151–93; and Y Benkler, The Penguin and the Leviathan: The
Triumph of Cooperation over Self-interest (Crown 2011).
11See L Floridi, J Cowls, M Beltrametti, R Chatila, P Chazerand, V Dignum, Ch Luetge, R Madelin, U Pagallo, F
Rossi, B Schafer, P Valcke and E Vayena, ‘AI4People – An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Oppor-
tunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations’ (2018) 28(4) Minds and Machines 689–707.
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The next section aims to deepen our understanding of the law as a regulat-
ory system and hence also of the diﬀerent kinds of norms the law has for the
governance of social and individual behaviour. Section 4 then scrutinises the
ways in which the middle-out interface works in the GDPR.
3. Law as a regulatory system
We admit that the law is not a simple set of rules. As shown by diﬀerent
schools – such as the classical and modern natural law tradition, legal
realism and the Law and economics view, old and new kinds of institutional-
ism, etc. – further dimensions of the legal phenomenon do exist. Still, by
dwelling on the regulatory side of the law, we can gain a fruitful perspective
on how lawmakers set the interface between the top-down and bottom-up
approaches. More particularly, the middle-out layer of the analysis draws
attention to two crucial facets of the legal phenomenon.
First, the law is not the only regulatory system out there. In addition to the
law, we have to take into account other regulatory systems, such as the market
and a shared set of social values and principles. According to a popular thesis
on law as code, or lex informatica, we should also concede that technology is a
regulatory system.12 In general terms, we may say that every regulatory system
claims to govern social behaviour by its own means, so that (i) regulatory
systems may compete; (ii) they can even render the claim of another regulat-
ory system superﬂuous; or (iii) they can reinforce each other. Two examples
illustrate these scenarios. On the one hand, the EU e-money directive 46 from
2000 reminds us of how legal regulation may fail: soon after the implemen-
tation of the directive, which aimed at expanding traditional forms of centra-
lisation to online interaction, new forms of payment, such as PayPal, forced
the EU legislators in Brussels to intervene. They had to amend themselves
with a new directive, n. 110 from 2009. On the other hand, Article 8 of the
1996 Copyright Treaty and Article 14 of the twin Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) oﬀer
a counter-example of how legal and technological regulations can go hand-
in-hand. These provisions represent the legal umbrella for the adoption of
such automatic techniques as digital rights management (DRM) in the
private sector, which enable copyright holders to monitor and regulate the
use of their protected artifacts. Multiple models of regulation, co-regulation,
and self-regulation aim to formalise the balance struck on this basis
between diﬀerent regulatory systems. The middle-out layer of the analysis
speciﬁes which balance was set out, once forms of top-down legislation and
pure bottom-up approaches have been discarded.
12See JR Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology’
(1998) 76(3) Texas Law Review 553–94; and L Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books
1999).
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The second crucial facet of the legal phenomenon has to do with diﬀerent
kinds of legal rules. In addition to the distinction between rules and prin-
ciples,13 we should distinguish between primary and secondary rules of the
law.14 The primary rules were introduced above in Section 2, as an illustration
of the top-down approaches: their aim is to directly govern individual and
social behaviour. The approach refers to the law as a set of instructions or
commands for every legal subject of the system, which hinges on the threat
of physical sanctions, as summed up with Kelsen’s formula ‘if A, then B
ought to follow.’ According to Herbert Hart, the secondary rules of the law
include rules of recognition, of adjudication, and of change, i.e. rules that
allow for the creation, modiﬁcation, and suppression of the primary rules reg-
ulating people’s behaviour. The role and function of the secondary rules of the
law and more speciﬁcally, the rules of adjudication and change can hardly be
overestimated in this context. The complexity of technological regulation has
increasingly recommended the adoption of this kind of rule.15 For example, in
the case of the GDPR, there are four diﬀerent types of secondary rules,
namely, mechanisms of (i) delegation of power and of (ii) legal coordination;
(iii) procedures for a pre-emptive approach to data protection; and (iv) mech-
anisms for eﬀective judicial remedies.16
This stance partially overlaps with the models of legal governance men-
tioned in the introduction and, moreover, it systematises them with a well-
established distinction of legal theory between diﬀerent kinds of rule.17 Regu-
latory options of governance and multiple scales of self- and co-regulation can
indeed be represented as a combination of primary and secondary rules. This
combination speciﬁes how the legal system establishes its own interaction
with further regulatory systems, such as technology, or the forces of the
market, striking a balance between top-down measures (e.g. an enforceable
statute), and bottom-up policies (e.g. multiple scales of self-regulation). The
middle-out interface that follows as a result provides a model for the ﬁeld.
Of all the possible combinations and taxonomies among the diﬀerent regulat-
ory systems and alignment of primary and secondary rules of the law, the
model speciﬁes the middle-out layer between hard law and policy recommen-
dations as a network of legal norms that strike the balance against technology,
market, and social norms. We can then discuss whether the model adequately
13The reference is here R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford University Press 1985).
14See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 1961).
15This theoretical notion of primary and secondary rules refers to the whole legal framework and should
not be confused with the notions recently introduced in algorithmic governance of (i) ﬁrst-order rules
(code automated design principles) and (ii) second-order rules (human response to user/legal requests,
i.e. new requirements operating on ﬁrst-order rules). See B Wagner, ‘Algorithmic Regulation and the
Global Default: Shifting Norms in Internet Technology’ (2016) 1 Etikk i praksis-Nordic Journal of
Applied Ethics 5–13.
16See U Pagallo, ‘The Legal Challenges of Big Data: Putting Secondary Rules First in the Field of EU Data
Protection’ (2017) 3(1) European Data Protection Law Review 34–46.
17See Hart (n 14).
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tackles the normative challenges of regulation, and whether or not it is
context-dependent, or can otherwise be transplanted into further domains
of the legal ﬁeld. The next section explores how this level of abstraction actu-
ally works with the example of the GDPR.
4. The GDPR’s middle-out interface
The GDPR hinges on the assumption that the processing of personal data is a
risky activity. The term risk appears 75 times in the EU legal text. In some
cases, risk is to be understood in terms of the probabilities of events, conse-
quences, and costs, so that liability policies, insurance premiums, or account-
ability schemes, can be determined according to the level of risk. At other
times, risk refers to the logic of risk production and how we intend to
manage it. In more general terms, we can associate the notion of risk manage-
ment with every adaptive attempt to reduce the complexity of the human
environment. As some claim, ‘risk management has been a fundamental
motivation for development of social and governance structures over the
last 10,000 years.’18 Yet, in today’s Risikogesellschaft,19 one of the main trans-
formations concerns the ways in which the logic of risk production has pre-
vailed over the logic of wealth production. From an institutional viewpoint,
the attention has shifted from matters of risk management to the network
of competences and institutions summarised by the idea of risk governance.
The regulatory options of risk governance concern (i) forms of self-regulation
and its variants; (ii) top-down tools of regulation, such as enforceable acts, sta-
tutes, or codes, plus administrative constraints; and (iii) a mix of such forms
and tools. Remarkably, the GDPR has adopted this latter regulatory option,
according to which public legislation establishes both the principles that
have to be followed by data controllers and the outcomes they should abide
by. It is up to data controllers, however, as to how they should attain such
ends. This form of co-regulation revolves around that which the GDPR
calls the ‘principle of accountability.’ Figure 2 illustrates the middle-out
layer of the model.
The principle of accountability is mentioned only twice in the legal text.
Recital 85 of the GDPR refers to accountability in connection with responsi-
bility for data breaches and risks for the data subjects’ rights and freedoms.
Article 5(2) mentions the principle as the way in which data controllers
shall be able to prove compliance with the ‘principles relating to processing
of personal data’ pursuant to Art. 5(1). The role of the accountability principle
in the GDPR has to be grasped, however, pursuant to the complex network of
rules and mechanisms set up by the EU regulation, namely, the set of primary
18See T McDaniels and MJ Small, Risk Analysis and Society (Cambridge University Press 2004).
19See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage 1992).
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION 9
and secondary rules that strike the balance between top-down measures and
bottom-up policies. Whereas the EU legislation establishes the principles data
controllers should respect – e.g. Art. 12 of the GDPR on duties of transpar-
ency and the protection of some data subjects’ rights, such as the right to
access – data controllers also have the obligation to assess the level of risk trig-
gered by their own data processing. Although not mentioned, the accountabil-
ity principle is also at work with the provisions of Articles 24(1) and 25(1). In
the former case, ‘the controller shall implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that proces-
sing is performed in accordance with this Regulation.’ In the latter case, data
controllers shall abide by the principle of privacy by design, and by default.
Risk assessments on data protection impact do not just regard those directly
aﬀected by such data processing, much as privacy by design solutions shall
comply with all the requisites of the regulation.
It is then up to the decision-making of data controllers as to how to
approach (i) the prevention of risk; (ii) pre-emptive measures by design,
and by default; and (iii) corporate organisational measures for the protection
and security of personal data processing. From this latter perspective, for
example, the aforementioned risk management and assessment of Art. 24
should be distinguished from the ‘security of processing’ of Art. 32. Although
Figure 2. The GDPR’s middle-out approach.
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the regulatory model is still at work, the speciﬁc duties and self-regulatory
eﬀorts of data controllers change. In particular, the security of processing
regards, also but not only, ‘the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal
data’ (lett. a); ‘the ability to ensure the ongoing conﬁdentiality, integrity, avail-
ability and resilience of processing systems and services’ (lett. b); ‘the ability to
restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the
event of a physical or technical incident’ (lett. c); and ‘a process for regularly
testing, assessing and evaluating the eﬀectiveness of technical and organis-
ational measures for ensuring the security of the processing’ (lett. d). There-
fore, Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 of the GDPR on security do not just set the
conditions for the fairness of the processing of personal data. They also aim
at preventing possible risks brought about by inadequate systems and services
of data processing.
As to the secondary rules of the law at work with the model, the account-
ability principle mostly refers to rules of adjudication, such as in Article 77
and ﬀ. of the GDPR. Risks of fragmentation that depend on multiple jurisdic-
tions of national supervisory authorities are tackled with further secondary
rules on coordination and procedural regularity, as in Articles 60, 61, 75(4)
and 97(2)(b). The model comprises a more complex mix of primary and sec-
ondary rules for some speciﬁc cases, such as impact assessments and the pro-
tection of corporate rights. In the ﬁrst case, according to Art. 36,
the controller shall consult the supervisory authority prior to processing where
a data protection impact assessment under Article 35 indicates that the proces-
sing would result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by the control-
ler to mitigate the risk.
The purpose is to set up and guarantee a pre-emptive, rather than remedial,
protection of personal data, so that privacy safeguards are at work even before
a single bit of information has been collected. In the second case, Art. 80 of the
GDPR establishes procedures for an eﬀective judicial remedy through a new
collective right to lodge complaints. Together with the rules of adjudication,
the purpose of the norm is, at least, to partially take into account how Big
Data treats types rather than tokens and hence, groups rather than
individuals.20
On this basis, we can specify the middle-out interface of the GDPR as a
(variable of the) model of co-regulation – namely, the principle of account-
ability – substantiated by a detailed mix of primary and secondary rules
(see Figure 2).
On the side of the principles and rules that should be implemented pur-
suant to the GDPR, Art. 5(1) lists (i) lawfulness, fairness, and transparency;
20See U Pagallo, ‘The Group, the Private, and the Individual: A New Level of Data Protection?’ in L Taylor, L
Floridi e B van der Sloot (eds), Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data Technologies (Springer 2017) 159–
73.
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(ii) purpose limitation; (iii) data minimisation; (iv) accuracy; (v) storage limit-
ation; and (vi) integrity and conﬁdentiality. On the side of the measures that
are to be taken at both organisational and technical levels, Articles 5(2), 24(1),
25(1) and 32 show data controllers (and processors) the ways in which they
shall prove compliance with the six sets of principles of Art. 5(1). The
accountability principle is thus the middle-out interface that strikes the
balance between the implementation of rules and principles of the GDPR,
and how data controllers should organise themselves, i.e. their own data
processing.
Naturally, this form of co-regulation has ignited a hot debate over the
past years, for example, as to whether this mix of primary and secondary
rules provides an appropriate model of legal governance or has set the bar
too high. In this context, attention should be drawn to another facet of
the debate on models of governance. As already mentioned in the introduc-
tion, one of the risks of today’s debate concerns the confusion between
models of co-regulation and that which this paper dubs as the middle-out
layer of the analysis. Although we admit that co-regulation is a sound
example of how the middle-out interface works in between the top-down
and bottom-up approaches, co-regulation is not the only way in which
such an interface can be conceived. In addition to the GDPR and further
models of co-regulation, current debate on the legal regulation of AI
oﬀers further examples of what a middle-out approach may look like.
Several policy documents, guidelines, and declarations on the governance
of AI and the Web of Data provide a rich test-bed and an important ﬁeld
of application for further models of legal regulation. They depend on how
the middle-out layer is designed.
5. A middle-out interface for AI
The governance of AI is one of the hottest topics in contemporary insti-
tutional debate. Three years ago, in 2016, the White House Oﬃce of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) conducted a series of public work-
shops on questions of AI and policy, culminating with a report that
addresses the many ethical issues related to AI, such as fairness, accountabil-
ity, and social justice, that need to be tackled with increasing transparency.
The Trump administration and the Pentagon released similar documents in
early 2019. Meanwhile, China declared its ambition to become the AI world
leader by 2030, and, in September 2017, the Russian president, Vladimir
Putin predicted that the nation becomes the leader in AI, will be ‘the ruler
of the world.’ European institutions have been making signiﬁcant contri-
butions of their own, such as the European Parliament’s Resolution from
February 2017, the Economic and Social Committee’s Opinion on AI
from May 2017, the European Commission’s AI Strategy and the Work of
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its High-Level Expert Groups on AI in 2018 and 2019, down to the work of the
Council of Europe. To this can be added the United Nations’ ‘AI for Good’
global summits, the OECD Reports, and several other corporate initiatives,
partnerships, and institutional proposals at the international level ranging
from the Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems
of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Committee
on Professional Ethics and the Public Policy Council of the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM), the World Economic Forum’s Center for
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the Future of Life Institute’s Asilomar Prin-
ciples, OpenAI, Partnership on AI, the Software and Information Industry
Association (SIIS), and the work of the AI4People project.21
Against this framework, we can distinguish diﬀerent models of governance
in accordance with the actors that should spearhead cooperation. The 2016 AI
Reports of the White House, of the EU Parliament and of the UK House of
Commons, for example, mostly revolve around cooperation between the gov-
ernment and private industry in the U.S., the Commission and a new advisory
agency in the EU, the government and a standing commission in the U.K.22
Whilst China and Russia privilege strict top-down approaches – and the
approach seems to work the other way around in the U.S. – current debate
and initiatives in the EU should be located in between. The co-regulatory
model of the GDPR shows, after all, an alternative way to both bottom-up
and top-down approaches; moreover, the GDPR’s model of co-regulation is
already valid law for AI processing of personal data. Could this model be
transplanted into the domain of AI?
All in all, three reasons suggest why this is not the case. First, we still lack a
list of principles to be enforced through forms of co-regulation in all ﬁelds of
AI, as occurs with Art. 5(1) of the GDPR. Second, the legal regulation of AI
does not just concern personal data issues (e.g. non-discrimination law).
Third, current AI regulation is already context-dependent: in addition to
the rules on data protection, there are a multitude of rules in the ﬁelds of
self-driving cars, drones, e-health, ﬁnancial services, and more. The test
and use of, say, autonomous ground vehicles has to do with both national
legislations and EU normative acts. In the ﬁrst case, consider the Spanish
instruction approved by the Dirección General de Tráﬁco (DGT) in Novem-
ber 2015; the Belgian Royal Order from 18 March 2016; the Italian ‘Smart
Road Decree’ from 28 February 2018; the French Law on ‘la croissance et
la transformation des entreprises’ from 11 April 2019; and so forth. In the
second case, the EU acts include (i) the Council Directive 85/374/EEC on
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
21See Floridi et al (n 11).
22See C Cath, S Wachter, B Mittelstadt, M Taddeo and L Floridi, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence and the “Good
Society”: the US, EU, and UK Approach’ (2018) 24(2) Science and Engineering Ethics 505–28.
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the Member States concerning liability for defective products; (ii) Directive
1999/44/EC on certain aspects, such as repair and replacement, price reduction
and termination, of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantee; (iii)
Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability concerning
the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure
against such liability; and (iv) Regulation 2018/858 on the approval and
market surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, com-
ponents and separate technical units intended for such vehicles.
The limits of the GDPR’s co-regulative approach recommend alternative
ways to think about the middle-out layer of our governance model. We
have to be attentive to current limits on any clear understanding of the
stakes of AI, since, for example, we often lack data about the probability of
events, consequences, and costs, in order to determine the level of risk in a
given ﬁeld of technological innovation. Some have proposed a model of ‘mon-
itored self-regulation’ for AI.23 This means that principles, organisational
measures, and technological solutions would be left up to the forces of the
market and of social norms, whilst the role of public institutions would
concern the monitoring of these activities. We may opt for ﬁxed or adaptive
monitoring, in real time or predictive, automated or used as a recommender
system.24 Still, from a legal point of view, these monitoring functions mostly
concern the secondary rules of the system. As worded in the proposal,
the European Commission should ﬁrst evaluate the services oﬀered to EU citi-
zens today and their likely evolution over time. And only if it emerges that those
services are unlikely to comply with the Guidelines [of the High Group of
Experts on AI Ethics], should the Commission consider more policy actions.25
Others recommend coordination mechanisms for AI and an alternative
form of ‘adaptive regulation.’26 This proposal rests on three basic assump-
tions. First, we should not overlook a substantial convergence in today’s
debate about the ethics of AI and the corresponding guidelines. A list of
no-regrets actions can reasonably be formulated at the top of the political
agenda, in order to prevent the chilling eﬀect of ideological debates and the
complexity of the legal environment. This list could contain (i) a sustained,
increased and coherent European research eﬀort, which provides for the
inclusion of ethical, legal and social considerations in AI research projects,
together with research about public perception and understanding of AI
and its applications; (ii) the creation of educational curricula and public
awareness activities around the impact of AI, involving schools, academia,
23See A Renda, Artiﬁcial Intelligence: Ethics, Governance and Policy Challenges (CEPS 2019).
24See K Yeung, ‘“Hypernudge”: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’ (2017) 20(1) Information,
Communication and Society (The Social Power of Algorithms).
25See Renda (n 23).
26The proposal is in the new work of AI4People, Good AI Governance (forthcoming).
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qualiﬁcation programmes in business and the public at large; (iii) the idea of
‘inclusive innovation’ and smooth transition to new kinds of jobs via reward-
ing human-machine collaboration; and (iv) the capacity of corporate boards
of directors to take responsibility for the ethical implications of companies’ AI
technologies.27
Second, we should prevent a misconception in the current debate. Going
back to the initiatives of the European Commission on AI, some interpret
the work of the High Group of Experts as if the aim were to ﬂesh out the
(moral) basis for legal regulation. Current discussions of those experts,
however, are not about what should or should not be done against current
legislation, or in spite of it. Rather, the debate is about how to complement
and strengthen the existing regulation. From both a moral and legal view,
the common ground is given by a long-standing tradition in Europe, which
is deﬁned by the 1950 Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Accordingly, both groups of experts on AI
& ethics and on AI & the law – set up by the Commission in 2018 – have
worked independently over the past months. Several ﬁelds of AI are already
covered by regulation, after all. Contrary to the approach of ‘monitored
self-regulation,’ the middle-out layer of the model has thus to take into
account old and new forms of legal regulation. Amongst the new forms, con-
sider the P2B paradigm and its adaptive rules for emerging innovation.28 Here
the law frames the use of a toolbox that can be adapted and customised for
each AI-driven sector through the adoption of codes of conduct, alternative
dispute resolution, independent ongoing expert analysis and real-time moni-
toring, down to fast-to-market rule-making and adjustment. These forms of
legal experimentation go hand-in-hand with the creation of lawfully de-regu-
lated special zones, that is, a sort of living lab for the empirical testing and
development of AI and robotics.29 Over the past ﬁfteen years, the Japanese
government has set up a number of special zones, or Tokku, to improve the
understanding of how AI systems may react in speciﬁc contexts and satisfy
human needs. The toolbox has concerned the ﬁelds of road traﬃc laws (at
Fukuoka in 2003), radio law (Kansai 2005), data protection (Kyoto 2008),
safety governance and tax regulation (Tsukuba 2011), road traﬃc laws in
highways (Sagami 2013), and so forth. These experiments have been particu-
larly popular, in Europe, in the ﬁelds of self-driving cars and drones. In 2016,
Sweden sponsored the then world’s ﬁrst large-scale autonomous driving pilot
project, whilst Germany allowed a number of tests with various levels of
27See Floridi et al (n 11).
28The P2B (platform to business) model is discussed in the new work of AI4People (n 26).
29See U Pagallo, ‘LegalAIze: Tackling the Normative Challenges of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Robotics
Through the Secondary Rules of Law’ in M Corrales, M Fenwick and N Forgó (eds), New Technology,
Big Data and the Law. Perspectives in Law, Business and Innovation (Springer 2017) 281–300; and Id,
‘From Automation to Autonomous Systems: A Legal Phenomenology with Problems of Accountability’
in International Joint Conferences on Artiﬁcial Intelligence Organization (IJCAI-17) (Melbourne, 2017, 17–23).
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automation on highways. The ﬁrst special zone for the test of drones in open
labs was established in the roundabouts of Antwerp in January 2019. Those
are all examples of secondary rules of the law employed as adaptive norms
for emerging innovation.
Third, the model hinges on coordination mechanisms. They should help us
deal with current limits on any clear understanding of the stakes of AI, con-
solidating forums for collective consultation and discussion. The aim of this
middle-out layer is to develop new standards, e.g. social standards in addition
to the setting of technological standards, as well as mechanisms for social
interaction. Among such coordinative mechanisms, think about a European
observatory for AI, participatory procedures for the alignment of societal
values and understanding of public opinion, multistakeholder mechanisms
upstream for risk mitigation, systems for user-driven benchmarking of all
marketed AI oﬀerings, or cross-disciplinary and cross-sectorial cooperation
and encouragement of debate.30 From a legal point of view, we can rationally
address on this middle-out basis the challenges of coordination, covering
many potential issues raised by the next-generation AI systems and managing
such requirements, which often represent a formidable obstacle for this ﬁeld
of technological innovation, such as public authorisations for security pur-
poses, formal consent for the processing and use of personal data, mechan-
isms of distributing risks through insurance models and authentication
systems, and more.31 This level of abstraction on the middle-out layer of
the model can be illustrated with another ﬁgure. See Figure 3.
Further details of the model should be elucidated. For example, consider
the distinction between the aforementioned European observatory for
AI and the development of ‘a new EU oversight agency responsible for
the protection of public welfare through the scientiﬁc evaluation and super-
vision of AI products, software, systems, or services.’32 The middle-out
approach of coordination mechanisms – contrary to, say, the model of
monitored self-regulation – is not incompatible with forms of top-down
intervention. Rather, this middle layer functions as the interface of
the model between legal regulation and self-regulation. Therefore, the
coordination mechanisms of the adaptive regulator may also include the
role of a Meta-regulator, which helps the vertical agencies, e.g. data
protection boards, do AI right. Still, the coordination tools of the adap-
tive regulator may also work the other way around with mechanisms
of engagement, e.g. forms of ‘designing-by-debate,’33 or ‘cooperative
30See Floridi et al (n 11).
31See Pagallo (n 29).
32See Floridi et al (n 11).
33See J Ausloos, R Heyman, N Bertels, J Pierson and P Valcke, ‘Designing-by-Debate: A Blueprint for
Responsible Data-Driven Research & Innovation’ in F Ferri et al (eds), International Conference on Respon-
sible Research and Innovation in Science, Innovation and Society (RRI-SIS2017) (Edition 1, 2018) 47–64.
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responsibility.’34 The mechanisms of smart regulation should indeed be (i)
clear enough to impose society’s preferences on emerging innovation,
while (ii) ﬂexible enough to accommodate the uncertainties of innovation
and, at the same time, (iii) suﬃciently agile to capture expanding under-
standing with increasing regulatory granularity.
Accordingly, the middle-out approach appears scalable, for growing
amounts of work can be suitably addressed by adding resources to the inter-
face of the model, while the model can also be complemented with further
mechanisms of systemic oversight. The next section explores this latter
aspect of the approach vis-à-vis the complexities of linked data systems,
their unintended eﬀects, and the protections that could and should be
embedded into both the dimensions and layers of the Web of Data.
6. A middle-out interface for the Web of Data
The middle-out approach has been partially described in today’s debate on
models of legal governance for the Web of Data. Legal governance can be
deﬁned as the twofold process in which (i) rules, principles and values
Figure 3. A middle-out approach for AI.
34See N Helberger, J Pierson, and Th Poell, ‘Governing Online Platforms: From Contested to Cooperative
Responsibility’ (2018) 34(1) The Information Society 1–14.
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enable regulatory systems to encompass legal instruments, (ii) and legal
systems can complementarily be represented, applied and implemented
through formal languages, machine-learning algorithms, natural language
processing, and computational ontologies. In a digital world, the complexity
of today’s regulation does not only concern the implementation of the law,
but also regards the interface of human and machine behaviour through insti-
tutional and social means.
Consequently, the middle-out approach has played so far a relevant role in
diﬀerent ﬁelds of expertise, such as socio-technical systems, artiﬁcial socio-
cognitive systems, human computing interaction, and ontology building. In
socio-technical systems, for instance, it has been shown that energy middle
actors between technology and implementation – such as congregations,
building professionals, and commercial building communities – ‘inﬂuence
upstream (i.e. top actors), downstream (bottom actors), and sideways
(other middle actors), through mediating, enabling and aggregating both
themselves and others.’35 This also holds for the interplay between private
and public service systems, such as national IT health systems. Whereas gov-
ernmental providers may have diﬀerent starting points, goals and resources,
government might help in funding the development process and providing
incentives that encourage clinical providers to acquire systems technically
and legally compliant with interoperative health standards, suitable for build-
ing emergent national health information grids.36
In human computing interaction (HCI), some have deﬁned the middle-out
design for urban HCI as ‘the process to draw on the collective knowledge of all
actors to provide greater opportunities for more inclusive and collaborative
community engagement processes.’37 Scholars describe their approach as fol-
lowing three stages of design, implementation and deployment, fostering the
integration of the objectives deﬁned by top-down decision makers with those
of the everyday people represented by citizens and community groups. Like-
wise, ﬂexibility, intuition and innovation are all properties of the middle-out
design strategies, which are prone to incorporate elements that had not been
planned in the original design.38 These are among the relevant features that
have proven very useful in ontology building, in which conceptualisation
35See Y Parag and KB Janda, ‘More than Filler: Middle Actors and Socio-technical Change in the Energy
System from the “Middle-out”’ (2014) 3 Energy Research & Social Science 102–12.
36See E Coiera, ‘Building a National Health IT System from the Middle Out’ (2009) 16(3) Journal of the
American Medical Informatics Association 271–27.
37See J Fredericks, G Caldwell, G Amayo and M Tomitsch, ‘Middle-out Design: Collaborative Community
Engagement in Urban HCI’ in OzCHI ’16 Proceedings of the 28th Australian Conference on Computer-
Human Interaction (Launceston, TAS, 2016) 200–4.
38See G Cockton, ‘The Architectural Bases of Design Re-use’ in DA Duce, M Rui Gomes, F Robert, A
Hopgood, JR Lee (eds), User Interface Management and Design. Proceedings of the Workshop on User
Interface Management Systems and Environments Lisbon, Portugal, June 4–6, 1990 (pp. 15–34)
(Springer 1991).
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often requires the speciﬁcation of competency questions into glossaries, taxo-
nomies and relations prior to deﬁning axioms and rules.39
Against this framework, it is our contention that the middle-out approach
provides a uniﬁed framework for current debates on socio-technical systems,
artiﬁcial socio-cognitive systems, HRI, or ontology building, much as the insti-
tutional implementation layer that is required to operationalise both projects of
linked democracy,40 and EU policies, such as the Interinstitutional Agreement
on Better Regulation.41 By casting light on that which lies in between the top-
down and bottom-up approaches, the middle-out stance grasps the essential
components of current models of governance, and what the desirables features
of such stratiﬁed interaction between bottom-up and top-down solutions may
look like. In the ﬁrst case, focus is on the decomposable andmodular features of
the approach; in the second case, attention is drawn to its scalability. Although
such aspects overlap, let us examine them separately.
6.1 The wind-rose model
We can increase the regulatory granularity of the middle-out approach by dis-
tinguishing the essential parts that are needed in order to take into account the
speciﬁc complexity of the ﬁeld under scrutiny. In light of the diﬀerent ﬁelds of
expertise mentioned above in the previous section, dealing with the govern-
ance of the Web of Data, the middle-out layer of the analysis should properly
be represented in connection with seven diﬀerent ingredients. From bottom-
up forms of self-regulation to hard law tools of hetero-regulation, such ingre-
dients concern three diﬀerent layers of modular adaptability that regard (i)
organic decentralisation and intermediate conceptualisation; (ii) systemic
interdependence and coordinated agency; (iii) semantic interoperability and
abductive reasoning. This interdisciplinary, blended and intermediate
middle-out layer is able to project intermingled eﬀects both to the enforceable
norms of the legal sphere (that is, inﬂuencing legislative drafting and case-law
outcomes), and to the procedures and policies of self-regulated bodies
39See M Uschold and M Gruninger, ‘Ontologies: Principles, Methods and Applications’ (1996) 11(2) The
Knowledge Engineering Review 93–136; and A Gómez-Pérez, O Corcho, and M Fernández-López, Onto-
logical Engineering (Springer 2002).
40See P Casanovas, D Mendelson and M Poblet, ‘A Linked Democracy Approach for Regulating Public
Health Data’ (2017) 7(4) Health and Technology 519–37.
41See, for example, the European Commission Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parlia-
ment, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making of 13
April 2016. OJ L 123, 12 May 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:123:
TOC and European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox 1, Principles, Procedures & Exceptions,
2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/ﬁles/ﬁle_import/better-regulation-toolbox-1_
en_0.pdf. The origins of such a perspective can be found in the seven core principles set nearly
twenty years ago by the Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation: necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity,
transparency, accountability, accessibility and simplicity. See the Mandelkern Group on Better Regu-
lation. Final Report, 13 November 2001. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_
regulation/documents/mandelkern_report.pdf.
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(inﬂuencing negotiations and collective agreements). Figure 4 plots the mech-
anisms that should eﬀectively enact and put into practice legal policies on the
Web of Data into digitised policy cycles of multi-stakeholder governance.
As awind rose for theWebofData, themiddle layer portrayed inFigure 4 aims
to stress that models of legal governance should be decomposable, modular and
scalable, in accordance with the following seven diﬀerent components:
1. Modular adaptability. In ecology, adaptability is deemed to be the ability to
cope with unexpected disturbances in the environment. In engineering,
modularity refers to the interrelation of the separate parts of a software
package or also to the partitioning of the design to make it manageable.
In multi-agent systems (MAS), it refers to the eﬃcient usage of compu-
tational resources.42 We can proﬁt from this notion to create adaptable
policies that can be combined into regulatory systems for legal governance.
2. Semantic interoperability. This notion indicates the ability of computer
systems to exchange data with a shared meaning to avoid the ambiguity
of natural language. This is an essential requirement to enable machine
inferencing and a reliable exchange of data between information
systems. Legal ontology building extends the middle-out approach to
identify intermediate concepts that can be used to create taxonomies, clus-
ters, classiﬁcation trees and extended further to specify ﬁeld concepts at a
Figure 4. A wind rose for the Web of Data.
42See AS Shirazi, S von Mammen and C Jacob, ‘Adaptive Modularization of the MAPK Signalling Pathway
Using the Multiagent Paradigm’ in International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature
(Springer 2010) 401–10.
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lower abstraction level.43 Recently, Distributed Ledger Technologies
(DLTs) have emerged as a way to manage and exchange digital assets
among a large number of agents in a decentralised way in the context of
Linked Data as well.44 This is connected with points n. 3 and 4.
3. Systemic interdependence. Dependence between elements of a system
deﬁnes its degree of complexity. Systemic interdependence in regulatory
systems facilitates its decomposition into operational sections to create
implementation plans that can evolve separately. Organisational studies
have shown the importance of creating layered internal normative bonds
between all stakeholders in normative systems. Normative Multi-Agent
Systems (NorMAS) develop this interdependence of socio-technical or
artiﬁcial socio-cognitive systems.45
4. Organic decentralisation. Decentralisation is the process by which the
activities of an organisation are distributed for planning or decision-
making purposes. Multi-stakeholder theory, as described by Savage and
McConnell, applies to the governance of the Internet,46 where a large com-
munity of companies, researchers and public institutions hold regulatory
powers, as occurs with the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) or
the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium).47
5. Intermediate conceptualisation. Legal intermediate concepts – such as
property, trust, risk or guilt – are essential to apply and implement the
content of legal norms and ethical principles. Policies are based and eﬀec-
tively depend on how these concepts are deﬁned from diﬀerent interpre-
tive standpoints. Non-standard deontic models to instantiate norms by
means of formal semantic rules lean on them.48
43See P Casanovas, N Casellas, JJ Vallbé, M Poblet, F Ramos, J Gorroñogoitia, J Contreras, M Blázquez and R
Benjamins, ‘Iuriservice II: Ontology Development and Architectural Design’ in Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law (ACM 2005) 188–94; N Casellas, Legal Ontology
Engineering: Methodologies, Modelling Trends, and the Ontology of Professional Judicial Knowledge
(Springer 2011); M El Ghosh, H Naja, H Abdulrab, and M Khalil, ‘Towards a Middle-out Approach for
Building Legal Domain Reference Ontology’ (2016) 2(3) International Journal of Knowledge Engineering
109–14. An overview on today’s state-of-the-art in P Casanovas, M Palmirani, S Peroni, T van Engers, and
F Vitali, ‘Semantic Web for the Legal Domain: The Next Step’ (2016) 7(3) Semantic Web Journal 213–27.
44See M Acosta, T Berners-Lee, S Dietze, A Dimou, J Domingue, LD Ibánez, C Janowicz, ME Vidal, A Zaveri,
‘Linked Data on the Web and its Relationship with Distributed Ledgers (LDOW/LDDL)’ May 2019 WWW
‘19: Companion Proceedings of The 2019 World Wide Web Conference, ACM 2019. See the proof-of-
concept for a Linked Data index onto a distributed ledger to query and retrieve data stored on the block-
chain in disparate locations, in A. Third, J. Domingue. Linked Data Indexing of Distributed Ledgers, in
Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web Companion (International World
Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee 2017) 1431–6.
45See G Andrighetto, G Governatori, P Noriega, P and L van der Torre, Normative Multi-agent Systems
(Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik 2013, vol. 4).
46See JE Savage and BW McConnell, Exploring Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance (Brown University,
East West Institute 2015).
47See M Poblet, P Casanovas and V Rodríguez-Doncel, Linked Democracy. Foundations, Tools and Appli-
cations (Springer 2019).
48See D Gabbay, J Horty, X Parent, R van der Meyden and L van der Torre, Handbook of Deontic Logic and
Normative Systems (College Publications 2013).
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6. Coordinated agency. In philosophy, agency is the capacity of an agent
(natural or artiﬁcial) to act in a given environment. Software engineering
conceives it as a collection of systems, made of technical and social
(humans and/or organisations) components in which human and artiﬁcial
behaviours interact. The design and analysis of such systems deal with the
social coordination of their components. Social coordination refers to
the mechanisms and processes mediating the contingent bonds between
the individual components, and which are subject to evolution.49
7. Middle-out (abductive) reasoning. The idea of emergence, i.e. that a group
of interacting units, or agents, produces eﬀects that cannot be inferred
from the properties or behaviour of any of the individual agents lies at
the core of this approach. As some state, ‘in a bottom-up approach,
basic building blocks are combined to resulting a higher order design
complexity, whereas the top-down approach starts with the desired
product of great complexity and follows its stepwise reduction into
numerous parts of lesser complexity’.50 Reasoning in a middle-out
approach sheds light on the outcomes of a ﬂexible induction vis-à-vis
innovation and unintended eﬀects at local level. Emergent phenomena
are produced bottom-up, while the behaviour of underlying units
follows a top-down direction. Middle-out reasoning uses variables to rep-
resent unknown terms and formulae, and can be used to select inductive
schemes.51
The middle-out approach’s wind rose for the Web of Data can be further
understood in connection with the desirable features of such stratiﬁed inter-
action which lies in between bottom-up and top-down solutions. The models
of governance examined so far can indeed be further integrated with
approaches that dwell on the vertical axis, i.e. from top-down to bottom-up
solutions, of the ﬁgures illustrated in this paper. This sort of vertical perspec-
tive sheds more light on the scalability of our approach.
6.2 Cross-fertilisation of the model
The analysis of the institutional layers and procedural mechanisms that are
at work with the diﬀerent models of legal governance examined so far can be
integrated with further approaches that expand our understanding of
current data-driven challenges with increasing granularity. In the work of
49See H Aldewereld, O Boissier, V Dignum, P Noriega, and J Padget (eds), Social Coordination Frameworks
for Social Technical Systems (Springer 2016).
50See S von Mammen, JP Steghöfer, J Denzinger and C Jacob, ‘Self-organized Middle-out Abstraction’ in
International Workshop on Self-Organizing Systems (Springer 2011) 26–31.
51See I Kraan, D Basin and A Bundy, ‘Middle-out Reasoning for Synthesis and Induction’ (1996) 16(1–2)
Journal of Automated Reasoning 113–45.
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Blasimme and Vayena,52 for example, the components of the approach
regard oversight structures and processes for such data-intense ﬁelds as bio-
medicine and AI. Such components concern (i) adaptivity; (ii) ﬂexibility;
(iii) inclusiveness; (iv) reﬂexivity; (v) responsiveness; and (vi) monitoring.
These features, which are summed up as the AFIRRM approach, can be visu-
alised as intersecting with the middle-out layer of our analysis, as shown in
Figure 5.
Correspondingly, the coordination mechanisms seen in Figure 3 in Section
5 above can be further speciﬁed according to the ways in which we address the
features of this approach.53 In particular:
1. The coordination mechanisms of smart regulation should be adaptable
and ﬂexible enough to accommodate the uncertainties of innovation
through appropriate forms of oversight, such as the European AI observa-
tory and the European AI Meta-regulator mentioned in this paper;
Figure 5. Cross-fertilising the middle layer with the AFIRRM approach.
52See A Blasimme and E Vayena, The Ethics of AI in Biomedical Research, Patient Care and Public Health (9
April 2019) Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract.
53See Blasimme and Vayena (n 52).
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2. Such ﬂexibility entails the capacity to treat diﬀerent technological appli-
cations depending both on their data sources and on their actual use,
including Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs).54
After all, many of the normative challenges of technology, such as AI
and the Web of Data, are context-dependent, from both a moral and
legal point of view;
3. Inclusiveness refers to the engagement of all aﬀected parties in delibera-
tions and decision-making practices about the use of data-driven technol-
ogies. The mechanisms of the adaptive regulation should be clear enough
to impose society’s preferences on emerging innovation;
4. Reﬂexivity concerns the sound scrutiny, assessment and evaluation of
risks;
5. Responsiveness refers instead to the aim of mitigating the eﬀects of unin-
tended issues, such as unauthorised access to personal data;
6. Monitoring regards the regular scrutiny of data-driven activities with their
eﬀects. The intent is to anticipate the emergence of new vulnerabilities and
undesirable outcomes.
Similar considerations could, of course, be extended to the wind-rose
model for the Web of Data as illustrated above in Figure 4. For the sake of
conciseness, however, we can leave aside details of this cross-fertilisation.
From a methodological viewpoint, what is more relevant here has to do
with the scalability of the middle-out level of the analysis on models of
legal governance for next generation Internet.55
7. Conclusions
The complexity of technological regulation has increasingly recommended the
adoption of new models of governance that revolve around that which lies
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This middle-out layer of
the analysis has been substantiated with the examination of three legal
domainswith their correspondingmodels, namely, (i) theGDPR’s accountability
model of co-regulation in the ﬁeld of data protection; (ii) the coordinationmech-
anisms of smart regulation for goodAI governance; and (iii) thewind-rosemodel
for the Web of Data. By taking into account the speciﬁc complexity of each
domain, such approaches aim to formalise the diﬀerent ways in which principles
and rules of the legal system may interact with forms of self-regulation. In the
54See M English, S Auer, and J Domingue, ‘Blockchain Technologies & the Semantic Web: A Framework for
Symbiotic Development’ in J Lehmann, H Thakkar, L Halilaj, and R Asmat (eds), Computer Science Con-
ference for University of Bonn Students (2016) 47–61.
55See the white paper by R Stevens, J Delaney, S Taylor, M Boniface, Monique Calisti, John Domingue,
Robert Szuman, B Belter, Next Generation Internet. Classiﬁcation and Assessment Methodology (EU
HUB4NGI, D1.1, 2018) <http://hub4ngi-white-paper-d.1.1.-ver.1.2.pdf>.
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wording of theAVMSdirective, we have shed light on the ‘legal link between self-
regulation and the national legislator.’ Themodels of governance that follow as a
result depend on how their middle-out layer has been set and designed.
The intent of this paper, however, is not to determine whether or not these
models of legal governance, such as the GDPR’s Art. 5(2) on the accountability
principle might properly tackle the challenges of data protection, or of AI, or of
the Web of Data. Rather, the purpose is to present the proper level of abstrac-
tion needed to address the complexity of today’s legal regulation. On the one
hand, current debate on the governance of AI and the Web of Data has
shown that models of co-regulation, such as in the GDPR, are but an instance
of the middle-out approach. Co-regulatory models of legal governance cannot
be transplanted as such into other domains of the legal ﬁeld. On the other hand,
regardless of how we design this middle-out layer of legal governance, the
stance appears both modular and scalable, since it accommodates the uncer-
tainties of innovation, imposing society’s preferences on emerging innovation,
while allowing us to capture expanding understanding of technological chal-
lenges with increasing regulatory granularity. Figure 3 on the coordination
mechanisms of smart AI regulation, Figure 4 on the wind-rose model for the
Web of Data, and Figure 5 on the cross-fertilisation of the middle-out approach
through the components of the AFIRRM model have all illustrated how this
stance actually works. The middle-out approach is indeed a powerful level of
abstraction that scholars will increasingly exploit in future years in the ﬁeld
of legal governance. As technological challenges grow increasingly complex,
the top-down and bottom-up approaches will become increasingly less fruitful,
and the more we should pay attention to the middle-out interface of the
analysis.
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